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PEKING AND THE MYSTERIOUS WEST
By Howard L. Boorman*
Fairbank, John K. (ed.). The Chinese World Order:
traditional China's foreign relations. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1968.
Young, Kenneth T. Negotiating with the Chinese
Communists: the United States experience, 19531967. New York: McGraw-Hill, for the Council on
Foreign Relations, 1968.
Harris, Richard. America and East Asia: a new Thirty
Years War? London: Times Newspapers Ltd., 1968.
The task of keeping the Western world, or at least the United
States, convinced that Chairman Mao and his current associates in
the Forbidden City at Peking are madmen is both demanding and
deadening. The Russian Communist leaders in Moscow, it is estimated, devote six days weekly to the chore, a stint paralleled by
the Chinese Nationalist leaders in Taipei. Dedicated antiCommunists from New York to Long Beach contribute significantly
to the effort, And the Chinese Communists themselves, not to be
outdone, appear to allot roughly half their working hours to programs designed to convince the American Congress that they are not
only intransigent but also intellectually insolvent and emotionally unbalanced. Given the din, it is hardly surprising that the
intelligent layman surrenders both diagnosis and prognosis to the
China experts.
But do the statements and actions of the United States government and the analyses and estimates of the China experts appear
any less irrational to the Chinese Communists? In political analysis, even as in novel writing, point of view determines approach.
To survey the explosions of the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution, for instance, from the rim of the volcano rather than
from within the crater is inevitably to make assumptions and to
spin conclusions which are at best vicarious and speculative. To
judge Washington from the doctrinal vantage point of Peking must
be, no less, to substitute imagination for reason and to see
mysterious conduct as the product of disordered reason,
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One challenge to the China-watcher is to counter irrationality where he can: at home. To this end, these three books
were written: one, to place in perspective China's traditional
expectations with regard to foreign relations; the second, to
describe a current behind-the-scenes exercise in Sino-American
diplomacy; the third, by an Englishman, to counsel rational
reappraisal of realities by the United States.
East Asia, so Mr. Richard Harris of The Times (London)
In The
concludes in America and East Asia, "is different."
Chinese World Order, Professor John K. Fairbank, professor of
history and director of the East Asian Research Center at
Harvard, has mobilized a substantial research effort designed
to assess one aspect of this difference: the distinctive
system of tributary relations through which China dealt with
non-Chinese states and rulers during the later centuries of
the imperial era.
The traditional Chinese world order was a graded, Sinocentric system revolving around the Central, or Middle, Kingdom.
It embraced three principal zones: first, areas most closely
connected by geography and culture with the inner Chinese empire:
Korea, Vietnam, the Liuch'iu (Ryukyu) islands" and, occasionally,
Japan; second, an Inner Asian zone, including tribes and states
of the nomadic peoples of Central Asia beyond the Great Wall
which marked the inland frontier of agrarian China; and, third,
an outer zone encompassing "barbarians" who came from states of
South and Southeast Asia and from Europe,
During most of the Ch'ing (1644-1912) dynasty--with which
The Chinese World Order deals--as in earlier centuries, China's
relations with surrounding areas in East Asia were, Fairbank
points out, strongly colored by the concept of Sinocentrism and
by the implicit assumption of Chinese superiority. China conceived itLelf cultural mother of the area, giving Korea, Vietnam and Japan such traditional features of Chinese civilization
as the ideographic system of writing, the Confucian system of
ethical rules governing political and social behavior, and the
examination-based, pattern of public administration as institutionalized in the bureaucratic Chinese empire. In practical and
power terms, China also assumed itself the hub of East Asia:
external relations were an extension of the principles of political and social order that formed the basis of the traditional
Chinese state and were, accordingly, hierarchic, ritualistic,
and nonegalitariano
One problem of China's pre-modern foreign relations lay in
relating Sinocentric theory to tributary realities. The papers
in The Chinese World Order--brewed by an impressive team of
scholars, both Asian and Western,distilled through an international conference held in 1965, and bottled by the Harvard
University Press--are generally of a high level and present an

organized array of data regarding the interaction of theory
and practice in the system. Particular mention should be
made of the papers by Wang Gungwu, the broadest survey yet
available of evidence concerning the psychological and political bases of pre-Ch'ing tributary relations, by Joseph F.
Fletcher on China and Central Asia (1368-1884), and by John E.
Wills, Jr. on the Ch'ing court's relations with the Dutch
(1662-1690).
Traditional Chinese perceptions regarding world order
form a major chapter in the history of man's political
experience. Implicitly the Fairbank volume, written by (and
primarily for) professional historians, assumes some indetermin&te relevance between history and contemporary politics.
Negotiating with the Chinese Communists, by Mr. Kenneth T. Young,
a former official of the American government, stems from the
corridors of Cold War diplomacy and opens windows to reflect on
some of the larger issues--strategic, psychological, and historical--involved in the current wrestling match between the
United States and the People's Republic of China.
Deputy representative at the armistice talks held with the
Communists at Panmunjom in Korea in 1953-54, Mr. Young later
served as American Ambassador to Thailand from 1961 to 1963 and
is now president of the Asia Society in New York. His objective
in the Negotiating volume is to provide description and analysis
of the protracted discussions between official representatives of
the United States and Communist China from the Korean armistice
of 1953 to 1967 and to assess the utility of these confrontations.
The Ambassadorial Talks, aptly labeled the "longest established
permanent floating diplomatic game" in modern history, present a
paradoxical record: virtually empty of results, but potentially,
in Mr. Young's view, full of consequences. Born of a littlenoted public statement made by Chou En-lai at the time of the
Bandung Conference in the spring of 1955, the Talks, conducted
first at Geneva and later at Warsaw, may be divided into two
periods. The first, which lasted for roughly three years after
1955, was essentially a long-distance diplomatic duel between
Chou En-lai and John Foster Dulles, then American Secretary of
State, marked by a single agreement successfully concluded
between Washington and Peking on the repatriation of civilians,
and characterized by Chinese Communist initiatives and by
American rebuffs. A second period, which has lasted from the
Taiwan crisis of 1958 to date, has been dominated by intermittent
initiatives from Washington, rejections from Peking, and a
pattern of diplomatic stalemate.
This unique and little-understood pattern of sub-diplomatic
relations between the most powerful nation and the most populous
nation of the world has, in Mr. Young's view, served the interests
of both governments and sustained a useful, if extremely circumscribed, channel of communications despite the political chasm

separating the two countries. Writing as a former professional
diplomat, he argues for continuation and expansion of the talks
as a further move that may at some point lead to substantive
negotiations on basic political issues. Negotiating with the
Chinese Communists is a major addition to the sketchy literature
on Sino-American relations since 1950, and is certainly the most
comprehensive survey that can be given while the official record
of negotiations remains unavailable for research purposes. Yet
the very professionalism of the account constitutes its principal
shortcoming. Because the author remains committed to the official
Washington view which sees the United States as a "vigorously
dynamic world-oriented"r power providing the "primary strategic
restraint" on an irrational, bellicose, and expansionist China, he
fails to place the particular conflict situation, within a general
analytic framework0
In key respects, United States policy assumptions were formulated in the emotional environment precipitated in 1950 by the outbreak of the Korean war and remain largely
unaltered eighteen years later0
Similarly, the pattern of the diplomacy of stalemate was set by the Panmunjom talks in 1953 and
has not--despite significant shifts in the official rigidity of
Washington. s position--indicated eagerness to confront the central
roadblock to substantive negotiations: the status of Taiwan0
United States political and military support of the Government
of the Republic of China continues to involve the United States
in buttressing what Peking deems a counter-revolutionary regime.
In America and East Asia, Mr. Richard Harris offers a
thoughtful British appraisal of the present pattern of conflict
in the Far Eastern theater and of the factors underlying a sitChina-born,
uation which could become a new Thirty Years War0
with extensive experience in China, Hong Kong, and Southeast
Asia, Mr. Harris is now assistant foreign editor of The Times
with responsibility for analysis of contemporary Asian problems0
Based in part on a series of three articles published in London
in early 1968, this trenchant discussion is premised on the
assumption that the major international confrontation of the
second half of this century may be the clash between East Asia
(symbolized by mainland China) and the United States, a conflict
shaped by the distincfive nature of these two civilizations and
exacerbated by the phase in their histories through which each
is passing.
East Asia, Mr. Harris begins, is more than a mere geographical area which escaped conventional Western colonial rule. East
Asia is essentially a civilization which, as it matured over the
centuries, developed a cohesive pattern of ideas common to its
constituent parts: principally China, Japan, Korea, and northern
Vietnam. This civilization was ideological in the sense that
government was conducted there in accordance with particular
assumptions regarding the nature-and proper destiny of man and
society: beliefs whose truth was held by the articulate elite

to be rational, self-evident, and unchallengeable. Because of
the political character of East Asian civilization and because
of the doctrinal norms that guided political and social life,
the area, despite internal differences, could be attacked but
never assimilated by the imperialist powers, either European or
Russian. China, for reasons of geographical extent, tradition,
power (either actual or potential), and prestige, held the
central position in the indigestible East Asian culture area.
China, as the English historian C. P. Fitzgerald has pointed out
elsewhere, "is the only large area which has never, at any period,
been brought under the rule of Western men, the only region in which
an alternative tradition, equally ancient [with that of the West],
has flourished and persisted down to modern times."
The present American clash with East Asia (of which both
the Sino-American impasse and the Vietnam conflict are manifestations) is at once a major feature of contemporary international
politics and a product of irrational and unsophisticated prejudices on the part of both major actors involved. The relationship has become virtually symbiotic: United States alarm that
its system is permanently threatened by Chinese Communism compounds China's inherent xenophobia, now inspirited by modern
revolutionary nationalism and by the virulent brand of antiimperialism which Mao has squeezed from Leninism. Paradoxically
the United States, despite its vaunted pragmatism, is, like
China, increasingly an ideological civilization
The doctrinal
foundations of Americanism, based on the classical texts of the
late eighteenth century and now resurgently propounded in the
late twentieth, appear elemental and self-evident to most Americans,- Yet in effect these tenets have bred an American civilization
which, in the view of even sympathetic non-Americans, appears
increasingly arrogant and inflexible, decreasingly relevant to
most areas of the world outside the middle latitudes of North
America.
In effect, Mr. Harris argues, the post-1950 involvement of
the United States with East Asia constitutes an ideological clash
in which both contestants share a similarly primitive view of the
centrality of ideology. In a concluding discussion of 'What the
Americans Are Up Against,' he stresses again the psychological
imperviousness of East Asia and the fact that its historical
evolution over two millenia bred a civilization which, in style
and texture, differs profoundly from other civilizations elsewhere in Asia or Africa or Latin America. For centuries that
civilization had a notably strong sense of identity, an attitude
that has included--or at least behaved as if it included--supreme
confidence that outsiders could not penetrate its walls and comprehend its workings. Because East Asia is a politically intractable
civilization nowgoing through an unprecedented process
of accelerated regeneration, it is likely to be even more resistant
than formerly to external efforts at direction, East Asian Communism,

it is suggested, is particularly adapted for indigenous purposes
and thus inherently unexportable
East Asiai.is, of all geographical and cultural areas of the non-Western world, the least
promising market for American ideals of liberalism and individualism. Mass democracy in the American sense runs counter to
all East Asian political assumptions and social traditions and
will scarcely be implanted by outsiders.
These three books stem from different backgrounds and
premises. Yet, taken together and seasoned with common sense,
they suggest that realistic appraisal of the present knotted
tangle of American preconceptions, policies, commitments, misunderstandings, and aspirations towards Asia deserves priority
on the new administration's agenda. Given present demands in
the United States and elsewhere in the world, Washington might
begin to reassess some official attitudes and policies. One
step would be to take a hard look at probable pay-offs on the
present level of massive American investment in the Far Eastern
theater. The United States may still be affluent. The problem
is whether it can still afford to be mysterious, even irrational,
in East Asia.

